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ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
N. . CoNsT. art. X, § 3:
Neither the state not any subdivision thereof shall use its
property or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit
either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance..
of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under
the control or direction or any religious denomination, or in
which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the
legislature may provide for the transportation of children to and
from any school or institution of learning.
U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion...
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DMSION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Grumet v. Cuomo I
(decided Aug. 26, 1996)
On appeal, plaintiffs Grumet and Hawk sought a judgment
declaring a New York law,2 which permits the establishment of
union-free school districts by municipalities, unconstitutional.
3
The United States Supreme Court upheld the state court's
determination that Chapter 748 of the New York Session Laws
of 1989,4 was violative of the First Amendment of the U.S.
1. 225 A.D.2d 4, 647 N.Y.S.2d 565 (3d Dep't 1996).
2. Infra note 6 and accompanying text.
3. Grunet, 225 A.D.2d at 6 - 7, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 566-67.
4. 1989 N.Y. Laws 748. Chapter 748 (hereinafter the prior law) states in
pertinent part:
§ 1. The territory of the village of Kiryas Joel in the towvn of Monroe,
Orange county, on the date when this act shall take effect, shall be and
hereby is constituted a separate school district, and shall be Imown as
1
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Constitution.5 Subsequently, New York enacted the current
law, Chapters 241 and 279 of the New York Session Laws of
1994,6 enacted by then Governor Cuomo. The current law
allows municipalities to establish their own union-free school
districts without the need for special legislation if they exhibit
the required demographic features. 7 Thus, the Village of Kiryas
Joel8 voted to approve the establishment of its own school
district to accommodate the Village's handicapped children.9
Consequently, plaintiffs commenced this action contending that
the Kiryas Joel village school district and shall have and enjoy all the
powers and duties of a union free school district under the provisions of
the education law.
Id.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in pertinent part
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
(referred to as the Establishment Clause) Id. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (holding that "the prior law 'crosse[d] the line from permissible
accommodation to impermissible establishment."'). Although the prior law
was found unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, nevertheless, that
it is all right for New York to enact such legislation. Id. The legislation,
however, is permissible only if properly implemented through "generally
applicable legislation." Id. at 2498 In concurrence, Justice O'Connor
provided New York with guidelines to craft such "acceptable legislation." Id.
6. 1994 N.Y. Laws 241. Chapter 241 (hereinafter the current law) states
in pertinent part:
Any municipality situated wholly within a single central or union free
school district, but whose boundaries are not coterminous with the
boundaries of such school district, may organize a new union free
school district, pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, consisting
of the entire territory of such municipality, whenever the educational
interest of the community require it.
Id. See also 1994 N.Y. Laws 279 (noting that this legislation was stated to be
necessary to provide education to the "handicapped children of Kiryas Joel").
Id.
7. Grumet, 225 A.D.2d at 8, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
8. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 691. The
New York Village of Kiryas Joel (hereinafter Village) is a religious sect of
Satmar Hasidism. Satmar Hasidism involves the "strict practice of Judaism."
Id at 690. The inhabitants of the Village are religious people who make "few
concessions to the modem world." Id at 691.
9. Grumet, 225 A.D.2d at 8, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
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the current law is unconstitutional because "it constitutes a de
facto reenactment of the prior law." 10 Further, plaintiffs
contend that the criteria set forth in the current law is not
neutral and is crafted exclusively for one municipality in the
State, the Village. 11 Based on the Supreme Court's analysis of
the law under the Lemon test12  and the New York
Constitution, 13 the New York Supreme Court held that "the
current law is constitutional," and dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint. 14 The plaintiffs appealed. 15
The court began its analysis by stating that New York cannot,
"consistent with the Establishment Clause of the [First]
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, enact special legislation
creating a school district coterminous with the Village." 16 This
issue was previously decided when the U.S. Supreme Court and
the New York courts struck down the prior law as violative of
the U.S. Constitution. 17 Plaintiffs asserted that the "[lI]egislature
simply resurrected the prior law [through] ...carefully crafted
indirect means." 18
The newly crafted law took effect less than two weeks after the
U.S. Supreme Court made its prior determination. 19 Although
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). This case sets out the
following requirements (hereinafter the "Lemon test") for constitutional
legislation: (1) "a secular purpose;" (2) "neither advanceD nor inhibit[l
religion;" and (3) no "excessive entanglement" between state and religion. Id.
at 612.
13. See NY CONST article XI, § 3. Section 3 provides in pertinent part:
[Tihe state... shall [not] use its property... or any public money, or
... permit either to be used ... in aid or maintenance ... of any
school . . . of learning . . . under the control or direction of any
religious denomination ...but the legislature may provide for the
transportation of children to and from any school ....
Id.
14. Granet, 225 A.D.2d at 8, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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the current law technically applies to all, the court, nevertheless,
determined that it crafted solely for the Village. 20 An analysis
of various data found that "the current law's demographic criteria
permit only one of the State's 1,546 existing municipalities to
qualify for its special treatment, the Village . ... "21 Further,
experts contend that the current law had no educational purpose
and went "against New York's established trend of consolidating
school districts .... "22 The defendants, however, contend that
the current law is neutral. The New York Supreme Court
disagreed.
To determine whether the current law was a "mere
subterfuge," the New York Supreme Court considered the
purpose for enacting the law.23 Although other municipalities
may be eligible in the future to have its own school district, the
court, nonetheless, did not find the current law neutral. 24
Moreover, the defendant has admitted that the current law was
enacted exclusively to "fulfill the purpose underlying the prior
law . . ",25 The New York Supreme Court agreed that,
although the current law seems neutral, it is deceiving. 26 When
the criteria was considered together, it identified the Village and
no other. 27 Furthermore, it was clear that legislation and the
Governor intended to assist the Village. Accordingly, this court
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and held
Session Laws of 1994 unconstitutional as violative of the
20. Id.
21. Id. at 9, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
22. Id.
23. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64-65 (1985) (holding that there
must be a "sincere" secular purpose for the law to survive constitutional
muster).
24. Grumet, 225 A.D.2d at 10, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
25. Id. at 10, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 569 (citing Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 693. The exclusive purpose of the law was
provide education to the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel. Id.
26. Grumet, 225 A.D.2d at 10, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
27. Id. See Stapleton v. Pinckney, 293 N.Y. 330, 334-36, 57 N.E.2d 38,
39-40 (1944) (providing that such legislation which is contingent on several
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.2 8
Justice Spain, for the New York Supreme Court, dissented, and
adamantly rejected the majority holding that the current law was
specifically created for the Village. 29 He stated that the
legislation did not violate the First Amendment because it was
not "designed to endorse or enhance religion, rather it provides a
permissible solution to the . . . dilemma faced by the people of
Kiryas Joel in meeting their needs of their handicapped children.
... "30 He reasoned that the current law passes both Federal and
State constitutional muster.3 1 Justice Spain also asserted that the
Legislature was "clearly acting within its prerogative in carving
out an exception to its general policy, especially where
compelling or unusual circumstances warrant such an
exception." 32 Lastly, he contended that the current law is a
general law applicable to all qualifying municipalities. 33
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the "government
may accommodate religious practice . . . without violating the
Establishment Clause." 34 Not only did the majority fail to
analyze this case constitutionally, but they also did not utilize the
Lemon test. 35 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
statute must guarantee that "governmental power will be
28. Gnunet, 225 A.D.2d at 10, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
29. Id. (Spain, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Spain, J., dissenting).
31. Id. See also Hotel Dorset, Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources, 46
N.Y.2d 358, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 413 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1978) (holding that
legislation affecting only one entity can qualify as "general legislation" if it
affects others "similarly situated").
32. Grunet, 225 A.D.2d at 17, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 573 (Spain, J.,
dissenting). At the New York Conference of Mayors, there was a strong
interest in the current law "permitting municipalities to organize new school
districts whenever the community interests require it." Id.
33. It seems as though the current law satisfied the Establishment Clause
concerns raised by the majority.
34. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45
(1987).
35. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
1997] 819
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neutrally employed."' 36 The dissent contends that because the
current law was enacted generally, it conferred its benefit upon
all qualifying municipalities. The legislation, therefore, did not
violate the Establishment Clause.37 Furthermore; if the majority
had used the Lemon test, then the current law would have been
upheld. 3 8
Plaintiffs contended that the current law violated the New York
Constitution. This section of the New York Constitution
prohibits the state from using public money to assist any
educational facility where any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught. 39 However, Justice Spain contended that this claim was
without merit because there was no attempt to "inculcate the
doctrine and faith of the denomination." 40  The plaintiffs
automatically presumed that since the residents of the Village are
Satmars, "it must be presumed that they are advancing their
religion through the school."' 4 1 The plaintiffs, however failed to
present sufficient evidence to support their presumption.
Moreover, the plaintiffs have not shown that the school is under
the control of the denomination. Accordingly, the current law
does not violate the New York Constitution.
42
In sum, the dissent proponed a valid argument asserting that
the current law neither favors nor endorses religion. The current
36. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982).
37. Grumet, 225 A.D.2d at 17, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 573 (Spain J. dissenting).
38. Under the Lemon test, the court would have noticed that (1) the current
law was intended to meet the educational needs of the village, and was not
"motivation of a religious purpose;" (2) the current law does not mention
religion let alone endorse or "promote religion;" and (3) there is nothing to
establish that this school is different from other schools similarly situated.
Grumet, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 573 -75 The current law, therefore, survives
scrutiny under all three prongs of the Lemon test.
40. Id.
40. Grumet, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (Spain, J., dissenting). See College of
New Rochelle v. Nyquist, 37 A.D.2d 461, 467, 326 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768 (3d
Dep't 1971) (holding that because a college was sponsored by a religious order
is not indicative that the college was under the control of a religious
denomination).
41. Grumet, 225 A.D.2d at 21, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (Spain J. dissenting).
42. Id. at 22, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (Spain J. dissenting).
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law is not disguised and it does not favor or promote religion.
Nevertheless, this Court held that the current law simply
"resurrected the prior law by achieving exactly the same result
through carefully crafted indirect means." 43 Even though the
current laws criteria, "standing alone," may be neutral, when the
criteria are "considered together they simply identify the
Village. " 44 The current law is merely a -camouflage" of the
prior law. 45 This Court concluded by stating "that there are a
number of constitutionally permissible ways to accommodate the
needs of the Satmars. We urge such a resolution." 4 6 Lastly,
Summary Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs, and the Laws
of 1994 were declared unconstitutional as violative of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 47
43. Id. at 9, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
45. Id. at 11, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
45. Id.
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